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Abstract 
This work provides an extension to an international context of the analysis made by 
Alfano, Baraldi and Cantabene (2013) on the role of political competition as a 
channel through which electoral systems affect corruption. Our result conflicts with 
that found by empirical literature on that topic that makes plurality rules the most 
virtuous in terms of corruption. Political scientists must be cautious in designing the 
degree of proportionality of electoral rules without take into account the variation in 
political competition that follows.  
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Introduction  
The choice of an electoral system is one of the most important institutional decisions 
for any democracy. A country’s electoral system is the method used to calculate the 
number of elected positions in government that individuals and parties are awarded 
after elections. In other words, it is the way that votes are translated into seats in 
parliament or in other areas of government. There are many different types of 
electoral systems in use around the world, and even within individual countries, 
different electoral systems may be found in different regions and at different levels 
of government (e.g., for elections to school boards, city councils, state legislatures, 
governorships, etc.). The choice of a particular electoral system has a profound 
effect on the future political life of the country;the electoral system guarantees the 
representation of voters’ desires and, once chosen, often remains fairly constant. 
Voting systems are generally divided into majoritarian/plurality rule and proportional 
representation (PR) with a number of variations and methods. In a democratic 
system, the mechanism of representation of political parties is also characterized by 
the degree of political competition among political parties and by the conflict between 
voters and candidates (the political corruption). 
This work deals the effect of electoral systems on the level of corruption of a country. 
The wide literature studying the causes of corruption (Tanzi, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 
1999), considers the electoral system a most important political determinant of 
corruption. Indeed, in the public sector, corruption arises and persist when 
bureaucrats and politicians possess discretionary power which allows to extract 
economic rents. This happens when institutions (political, bureaucratic, juridical and 
economic) are weak (Aidt, 2011). Electoral rules characterize those institutions, as 
to the degree of political competitiveness among political parties. The theoretical 
literature investigating the relationship between the electoral system and corruption 
seems to conclude that the way in which electoral rules affect corruption depends 
on contrasting forces while the empirical literature suggests that countries with 
proportional systems have much more widespread corruption than countries with 
majoritarian systems (see subsection 2.1). 
That literature, theoretical and empirical, seems to completely neglect the role played 
by political competition in the link between the electoral system and corruption. 
Political competition (defined as the competition among political parties to collect 
votes at elections, that is, as the competition for political power (Bardhan and Yang, 
2004)) may be an important channel through which the electoral system affects 
corruption. Both the electoral system and political competition use the same 
mechanism to affect corruption: the accountability of incumbent politicians but, as for 
electoral rules, political competition may drive corruption in opposite directions. 
Moreover, we may believe that the electoral system has some effect on the degree 
of political competitiveness among political parties. Here we are interested in 
underlining that the literature, in particular the empirical literature, did not consider 
that political competition might affect corruption in combination with electoral 
systems. Alfano, Baraldi and Cantabene (2013) (hereafter ABC) were the first to 
attempt this unexplored issue. The deep analysis of the complex web wrapping 
electoral systems, political competition and corruption motivated the hypothesis 
formulated by ABC that the electoral system may affect corruption directly and 
indirectly, via political competitions.The two effects may drive corruption in the same 
direction or in the opposite one; the total effect of the degree of proportionality of the 
electoral formula on corruption is the sum of the two effects. ABC use the suitable 
Italian scenario and the Gallagher disproportionality index as a measure of the 
degree of proportionality of an electoral system to test their hypothesis. They find 
that the way in which corruption is affected by the proportionality degree of an 
electoral system (that is, the total effect) depends on how the degree of political 
competition reacts to changes in the degree of proportionality of the electoral rule. 
The last issue is still unexplored. This powerful result underlines that it can be 
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misleading to analyze the impact of electoral rules on corruption regardless of the 
role of political competition, and further investigations are encouraged. 
We pick up the invitation of the authors. We extend the testing hypothesis of ABC to 
an international context, on a cross-country panel data and we use different 
measures of corruption, available at the cross-country level, in order to check the 
robustness of results. 
Our finding confirmed that of ABC. Firstly, the direct effect of the degree of 
proportionality on corruption is positive: an increase in proportionality of the electoral 
rule is beneficial for corruption. This result conflicts with that of previous empirical 
literature on a cross-country basis. The interpretation of this contrasting result is 
linked to the measure of the proportionality degree of the electoral system we used 
which allowed us properly to consider all electoral systems variants in an empirical 
setting. Secondly, as in ABC, we find that the indirect effects matter: political 
competitiveness is a channel through which the electoral system affects corruption 
and the direction of its effect depends on the degree of proportionality of the electoral 
system.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the ABC framework and 
shows the extension we made to their model. Section 3 describes the empirical 
model and variables we used. Section 4 explores the empirical strategy and shows 
the results. Section 5 presents the concluding remarks. 
The framework and the extension 
Before describing our work, we briefly summarize the general framework of the 
existing literature on the link between electoral systems and corruption which the 
ABC analysis refers to.  
The ABC framework 
The theoretical literature has explored the impact of electoral rules on corruption 
according to two dimensions: the district size (i.e. the number of seats in a district) 
and the electoral formula (i.e. how votes are translated into seats). Regarding the 
district size, PR promotes competition among politicians reducing the possibility of 
rent for incumbents (Myerson, 1993; Ferejohn, 1986); instead, looking at the 
electoral formula, the greater accountability of politicians induced by majoritarian 
representations provides a lower incentive for corruption than in PR (Persson and 
Tabellini, 1999a,b; 2000). Therefore, from the theoretical point of view, the effect of 
the electoral system on corruption goes in opposite directions. The empirical 
literature suggests that countries with proportional systems have much more 
widespread corruption than countries with majoritarian systems (Persson et al., 
2003; Gagliarducci et al., 2011; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005). 
The study of effects of political competition on the economic variables is limited. 
Political competition may affect economic performance via the quality of politicians 
(Besley et al., 2010; Padovano and Ricciuti, 2009; Alfano and Baraldi, 2012). In the 
political economy literature, the concept of political competition seems close to that 
of accountability for incumbents (Persson et al., 1997): if political competition is 
intense, the incumbent politician is more accountable for his actions in office and has 
an incentive for good performances because, otherwise, he can be easily removed 
and replaced by the public, with challengers. Therefore, according to this concept, 
an intense political competition leads to less corruption (Mulligan and Tsui, 
2006).Otherwise, when political competition is intense, the electoral base of each 
party tends to be smaller, the probability of re-election reduces and politicians have 
an incentive to adopt myopic behavior maximizing rents during their remaining time 
in office, and corruption increase (Stigler, 1972). Also for political competition, its 
effect on corruption is difficult to define.  
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While it is widely documented that the party system is largely determined by the 
choice of the electoral system (Duverger, 1954; Cox, 1997; Lijphart, 1994; 1999; 
Sartori, 1976; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989), there is no evidence about the 
relationship between the latter and political competitiveness among parties. The 
number of political parties competing at the elections does not measure the degree 
of political competitiveness among them. As Sartori (1976) pointed out, for political 
competition, it is important, indeed, to consider the relative size of political parties 
(this will justify the choice of the Herfindahl index). 
The electoral system and political competition use the same mechanism in order to 
affect corruption and it is not hard to assume that the electoral system has some 
effect on the degree of political competition.  
This last consideration, within the framework of political determinants of corruption, 
motivated the ABC analysis. ABC advance in the empirical literature on the link 
between electoral systems and corruption in two ways. Firstly, they were the first that 
consider the role of political competition in the relationship between the electoral 
system and corruption. They argued that electoral systems, political competition and 
corruption are wrapped in a complex web and formulate the hypothesis that there is 
a direct and an indirect effect of electoral rules on corruption, the latter via political 
competition. Secondly, they distinguished electoral systems by using a continuous 
measure of their degree of proportionality (the Gallagher disproportionality index), 
differently from previous works which did that by using dummy variables (Persson et 
al., 2003). Indeed, the electoral rules a country decides to adopt defines the way in 
which votes obtained by political parties are translated into seats in Parliament; it 
defines the degree of proportionality of the electoral system. Therefore, in order to 
properly consider electoral systems in an empirical setting, a measure of its degree 
of proportionality is the correct way. A further advantage of such a measure of 
proportionality is the possibility to consider mixed electoral rule, beside the PR and 
majoritarian. Indeed, mixed electoral systems, combining PR and majoritarian 
elements, are more likely to be characterized by intermediate degrees of 
proportionality. ABC exploited the Gallagher disproportionality index (Gallagher, 
1991) in order to treat Italian mixed systems, that is, to differentiate mixed rules that 
alternate according to their degree of proportionality during the time span they 
consider for the analysis. They computed the Gallagher index using the electoral 
outcomes of the Senate elections from 1979 to 2006 for the 20 Italian regions.  
ABC tested their hypothesis on a sample of the 20 Italian regions since 1979 to 2005 
arguing that it is a suitable scenario because of the particular characteristics of 
corruption and the electoral system. The hypothesis of the ABC analysis is that direct 
and indirect effects of electoral rules on corruption may drive corruption in the same 
direction or in the opposite direction depending on how the degree of political 
competition reacts to variations in the degree of proportionality of the electoral rule; 
therefore, the total effect of the electoral system on corruption is the sum of the two 
described effects. 
ABC measure the degree of political competitiveness among political partiesthrough 
the normalized Herfindahl index over the votes of each political party at elections 
from 1979 to 2006. The indirect effect of the electoral system on corruption has been 
caught by an interaction variable constructed by multiplying the two political indices 
just above described.  
As a dependent variable, ABC used the number of crimes against public 
administration and estimated a distributed lag model, where corruption is regressed 
on the past values of regressors. The reason of the choice of a distributed lag model 
relies on the kind of dependent variable they used. Indeed, corruption crimes 
perpetuated in a given year may be actually detected contemporaneously or with 
lags; crimes committed at different times can be detected contemporaneously; there 
is a lag between the beginning of the investigation and the conclusion of the penal 
action. Thus, the empirical model should allow for lags between the year the crime 
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is committed and that of the sentence, that justifies the estimation of a distributed lag 
model, where corruption is regressed on the past values of regressors, with lags 
from 2 to 4 years. 
ABC found the following results: 
• The direct effect of the degree of disproportionality of an electoral rule on 
corruption is positive: the more the degree of proportionality of the electoral 
system the less the level of corruption. 
• The indirect effect shows that the way in which political competition affects 
corruption depends on the degree of proportionality of the electoral rule: there is 
a threshold of the degree of proportionality that allows us to separate an increase 
from a decrease of corruption due to an increase in the concentration of votes in 
the hands of political parties.  
• The total effect depends on how political competition reacts to changes in the 
degree of proportionality. If the Gallagher index is below the threshold and if it is 
assumed that political competition moves in the same direction as the degree of 
proportionality of the electoral rule, the beneficial (negative) effect on corruption 
of an increase (decrease) in the degree of proportionality of the electoral system 
is reinforced by an increase (decrease) in political competition; otherwise,if the 
two indexed move in opposite direction, the two effects go in opposite direction 
and the total effect on corruption is indeterminate. When, instead, the value of 
the Gallagher index goes up to that threshold and an increase (decrease) in 
political competition follows an increase (decrease) in proportionality, the direct 
and indirect effects drive corruption in opposite directions; if the variations of the 
two political variables are reversed, the overall effect on corruption is the same. 
Table 1 below offers a graphical illustration of the ABC results. 
Table 1. Effects of the degree of proportionality of the electoral system on 
corruption 
Effect on the 
level of 
corruption 
 Below the threshold Above the threshold 
Direct (ΔGDI) + (-) + (-) + (-) + (-) 
Indirect (ΔNHI) + (-) - (+) + (-) -(+) 
Total + (-) +/- +/- + (-) 
Authors’ elaboration 
The authors conclude, firstly, that this “within country” result contrasts with the 
previous cross-country one that, instead, stated that countries with PR have much 
more widespread corruption thancountries with majoritarian representations 
(Persson et al., 2003); secondly, that, assuming a variation in the degree of 
proportionality of the electoral system only, is not sufficient to establish what is the 
consequent trend of corruption; how political competition reacts to some changes in 
the degree of proportionality should allow us to draw conclusions. The relationship 
between the electoral system and political competition still remains unexplored. 
The extension 
The hypothesis that ABC test and the results they found are very interesting within 
the political determinants of corruption framework. But, as they suggest, further 
investigations in that topic are needed. The present work tries to fill some 
weaknesses of the ABC analysis; in detail, we are referring to: 
1) the “within-country” analysis. Italy certainly provides a suitable scenario, but 
results (as the authors stressed) could be unresponsive to other realities; 
2) the Gallagher index, although it is on the Italian regional basis, was computed 
under the same electoral rule over time. That is, changes in the Italian electoral 
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system during the period under exam concerned all the regions at the same time. 
This is the reason why the Gallagher index showed little variability across regions 
(indeed, it ranges from 0.02 to 0.52); 
3) the cross-sectional dimension of the Italian panel data is short (N = 20 Italian 
regions); this may create some problem in estimations using the system GMM 
technique which, instead, is designed for panel with short T and long N. 
Thus, we test the same hypothesis as ABC to a cross-country scenario. We conduct 
the empirical analysis on a panel of 85 countries over 28 years (from 1984 to 2010). 
This extension to ABC’s work allows us to compare our results with those previously 
found by the literature. It seems very interesting to the light of the more suitable 
measure we used to distinguish electoral systems and their degrees of 
proportionality that were never done before. Moreover, the panel dimensions are 
perfect to exploit the system GMM estimation technique. 
The empirical model and variables 
The estimated equation of country i at time t is 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ∑𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺 + 𝛽𝛽3(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 ∗ 𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺) + ∑𝛿𝛿 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ++𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡         (1) 
Where αi is a country specific effect, µt is a time-specific effect. The dependent 
variable is the Corruption index (thereafter Corr) provided by the International 
Country Risk Guide - ICRG. (Even though the ICRG database includes a collection 
of records for about 150 countries, our analysis is cut off from some countries which 
showed few observations. Therefore we reduced the dataset to 85 countries. Table 
A1, Appendix, provides a full description of the variable.) It is a measure of 
“perceived” corruption and is one of the three most popular indices based on 
corruption perception. The other two are the Corruption Perception Index (by 
Transparency International) and the Control of Corruption index (by the World Bank). 
It summarizes the valuation of corruption within the political system; in particular, it 
deals with the warning for foreign investments. The Corruption index ranges in an 
interval [0 to 6] where 0 represents the highest risk of corruption and 6 is the lowest 
risk; it provides the longer time series of corruption data, from 1984 to 2010. Tables 
A2 and A3, Appendix, show respectively the descriptive statistics of Corr and partial 
correlation. 
Figure 1 below shows an overview of the Corruption index distribution for different 
countries. For each country in the figure we calculated the mean over years (1984-
2010). To the left with a high index value (meaning low corruption risk) we find the 
Scandinavian countries and the three countries of Oceania (Australia, New Zealand 
and Papua New Guinea). European countries in the dataset show low/medium levels 
of corruption while countries in Asia, Africa and South America have the highest 
value.  
Figure 1.  Mean of Corruption index over the years 
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The dynamic panel data model (as equation (1)) can be identified only for stationary 
time series cross-sectional data; therefore, a panel test for unit roots on the 
dependent variable Corr is needed. We perform the Fisher-type test developed by 
Maddala and Wu (1999). A Fisher-type test combines the p-values from N 
independent unit root tests. It is based on the p-values of individual unit root test; the 
null hypothesis is that all series are non-stationary against the alternative that at least 
one series in the panel is stationary. We chose this test because it does not require 
a balanced panel. At 1 percent we reject the null hypothesis of non-stationary series, 
thus our dependent variable does not show unit root. We perform the Fisher-type 
test including drift and 1, 2 and 3 lags in the individual ADF regressions. We always 
reject the null. The test is not shown. 
Two lags of the dependent variable are introduced in the estimated equation 
because of the dynamic of corruption (Aidt, 2003). Estimations of equation (1) 
without lags of Corr showed autocorrelation of residuals. In order to solve this 
problem, we introduced two lags of the dependent variable in the right-side of 
equation (1). 
The two regressors of our interest are political indices.  
The first one, as mentioned above, is the Gallagher disproportionality index. As in 
ABC, we use it as a measure of the degree of proportionality of the electoral system. 
As for the within-country analysis, this is a novelty also in the cross-country empirical 
literature on the effects of electoral systems on corruption. The Gallagher index (or 
least squares index) is a representation index of political parties within a Parliament; 
it may be considered as a very good proxy for the degree of proportionality of an 
electoral system because the electoral system that guarantees a greater 
representation of political parties is a more proportional one while the less 
representative one is less proportional. Moreover, empirical studies have shown that 
a majoritarian system produces a higher level of disproportionality than a 
proportional representation system (Lijphart, 1994; Anckar, 2001), whereas a mixed-
electoral system produces an intermediate level (Powell and Vanberg, 2000; Anckar, 
2001). The Gallagher index (thereafter GDI) is constructed as 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 = �12� (𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖)2𝑖𝑖  
where vi and si are respectively the share of votes and of seats of a single political 
party (i=1,....,n political parties) at elections in each country in the time span under 
consideration. The index may range from 0 to 100 with 100 indicating perfect 
proportionality between seats and votes and 0 meaning that the only seat at stake 
goes to the winner (in which case the index equals the percentage of votes obtained 
by the defeated candidate). Clearly the bounds of the GDI (0 and 100) are only 
theoretical values. Among the investigated countries, the GDI ranges from 0.26 to 
about 33 (see table A2, Appendix, for the descriptive statistics of the GDI). The 
dataset comprises countries that experienced majoritarian, proportional and mixed 
systems. The upper bound of the GDI (33.25) is very far from the theoretical value 
of 100 of perfect disproportionality. This means that also countries under plurality 
rules have a relatively strong proportionality. Therefore, all the three systems have 
a certain degree of proportionality; moving from PR to majoritarian systems, such 
degree of proportionality decreases. 
The other political index measures the political competitiveness among political 
parties at elections. It is the Herfindahl index (HI) calculated as: 
𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺 = �𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖2𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
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where vi is the vote share of a single political party at elections in each country from 
1984 to 2010 and n is the number of political parties at each election. It ranges from 
0 (theoretically perfect competition with n equally sized parties) to 1 (monopoly) and 
it is open on the lower bound. The Herfindahl index is usually used to measure the 
size of firms in relation to an industry; therefore, it is an indicator of the amount of 
competition among them. Following Stigler (1972), which interprets competition in 
the market for votes as competition in the goods’ market (the more competitive the 
parties, the more responsive the political system will be to the desires of the 
majority), an index of goods’ market power seems the correct way to measure the 
market for votes’ power. ABC employed the normalized Herfindahl index because of 
its desirable properties for that kind of analysis. We are forced to use the standard 
Herfindahl index because we are unable to collect the number of political parties at 
elections in each country, required to construct the normalized Herfindahl index. 
Table A2, Appendix, summarizes the descriptive statistics of this index.  
The direct effect of the degree of proportionality on corruption is caught by the 
coefficient β1 in eqaution (1). The indirect effect is caught by the coefficient β3 of the 
interaction term GDI*HI. 
De Haan and Seldadyo (2005) in their survey on the causes of corruption, detect 
tens of such determinants. Among them, we chose, as control variables, those we 
believed the more suitable for the analysis we will perform. Therefore, control 
variables are: 
• Per capita GDP, in natural log (lngdp); it controls for structural differences in 
economic development (De Haan and Seldadyo, 2005). We expect its positive 
correlation with perceived corruption (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; La Porta et al., 
1999; Treisman 2000). Hall and Jones (1999) and Kaufmann et al. (1999) 
question the causal relationship between corruption and income: the per capita 
GDP is high because of low corruption. For this reason we treat lngdp as 
endogenous. 
• Population (pop); it controls for country size. Empirical literature found 
contrasting evidence (Knack and Azfar, 2003; Tavares, 2003). 
• Government stability (gov_stab); it controls for quality of government. The higher 
the quality of government, the lower the probability of corruption (de Haan and 
Seldadyo, 2005). 
• Democratic accountability (dem); it controls for the level of democracy of a 
country. There is a general consensus that democracy reduces corruption (de 
Haan and Seldadyo, 2005). 
• Freedom of press (press); it controls for democratic governance. Informed voters 
are better able to hold elected officials accountable for their policy decisions; the 
greatest part of people get their information via the media (Snyder and 
Stromberg, 2008). This variable is found to be negatively correlated with 
corruption (Brunetti and Weder, 2003). 
• Law and Order (law_order); it controls for the rule of law as a measure of the 
confidence that agents have in the rules of society, the effectiveness of judiciary 
and the enforceability of contracts (de Haan and Seldadyo, 2005). A stronger 
rule of law reduces the likelihood of corruption to take place. Also in this regard, 
an issue of causality may emerge: agents may have trust in the rule of law 
because corruption is low. In order to take this problem into account, in some 
estimations we treat law_order as endogenous.   
• Woman (wom); it is the proportion of seats held by women in national 
parliaments (percentage); it controls for the gender dimension of corruption 
meaning that conventional wisdom states that women in public life can be an 
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effective anticorruption strategy because women are less corruptible than men 
(Dollar et al., 1999; Goetz, 2004; Sung, 2003). 
• General government consumption expenditure (G); it controls for government 
size. There is no consensus among authors on the theoretical relationship 
between government size and corruption (Abdiweli and Hodan, 2003; Bonaglia 
et al., 2001; Fisman and Gatti, 2002). We normalize general government 
consumption expenditure in percentage of GDP and per capita. 
• Net enrollment primary rate, in natural log (lnschool); it controls for the human 
capital development. Empirical literature found contrasting evidence (Ali and 
Isse, 2003; Frechette, 2001). Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3, Appendix, show 
respectively the detailed description of all the variables, the statisticsand the 
correlation matrix. 
•  
We follow standard practice of counting a country as democratic according to its rate 
of Polity IV political freedom score; we define as a democracy a country which scores 
a Polity IV index greater than +3 in the year of the election (Gleditsch and Hegre, 
1997). See table A.1 for a detailed description of this index and table A.2 for its 
descriptive statistics. 
In order to generalize the estimation results, we will provide robustness checks by 
using other measures of corruption available at cross-country level.  
Empirics 
Empirical strategy 
Equation (1) is a dynamic panel data model which has been estimated using 
Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) system GMM estimators;1 estimation 
results are shown in Table 2.The empirical analysis has been conducted on a panel 
of 85 countries over 28 years (from 1984 to 2010). In order to control for 
heteroskedasticity, every estimated equation has cluster-robust standard errors. The 
second-last raw of Table 2 (see sub-section 4.1) shows the Chi-squared (and the p-
value in parentheses) of the Hansen test whose null hypothesis is that the over-
identification restrictions are valid; we do not reject the null and the model is correctly 
specified. (We also compute, but we do not show, the difference-in-Hansen test in 
order to test the joint validity of the full instrument set; we do not reject the null.) The 
last raw of Table 2 displays the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for second-order 
autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals; the null hypothesis is the absence 
of autocorrelation of residuals that we always accept.In order to control for common 
shocks in a given year, calendar year dummies are included. (In Table 2 of 
estimation results we do not display such dummies.) Every specification in Table 2 
is estimated by the two-step options with the Windmeijer (2005) correction. 
Windmeijer (2005) finds that the two-step efficient GMM performs somewhat better 
than one-step in estimating coefficients, with lower bias and standard errors, and 
that the two-step estimation with corrected errors is superior to robust one-step. 
We start estimating equation (1) including the two typical controls in cross-country 
analysis, the (log of) per capita GDP and the population size; in order to test the 
robustness of results, in the following specifications we add, step by step, all the 
control variables described above. All the regressors in equation (1) are introduced 
contemporaneously: given that our dependent variable is an index of perceived 
corruption, we have no reason to believe that this perception by citizens is affected 
1 We used the Stata command xtabond2 provided by David Roodman (2009) 
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by past values of the variables. This is the reason why we do not introduce lag 
structure in the estimated model. An important issue here is to deal with the 
possibility of endogeneity of the Gallagher index. First of all, the theoretical literature 
analyzing the link between electoral rules and corruption considers the first as a 
determinant of corruption and not the reverse. Second, it seems unlike to think that 
the perception of corruption (as a menace for foreign investments) may affect the 
way in which electoral system is designed by politicians; third, it seems also unlike 
to believe that a more or less corrupt system may affect the way in which votes are 
translated in seats, as the electoral system does. However, an endogeneity problem 
may arise when dealing with political institutions, that is, there may be some omitted 
factors that influence electoral systems and simultaneously influence corruption.In 
order to verify the exogeneity of GDI we perform the C test on the GDI variable. 
Under the null, the Hansen statistic tests the validity of a subset of orthogonality 
conditions. To perform the C test we have to estimate two models, one where GI is 
exogenous and another where the GI is endogenous. The estimation of the first 
model gives us a Hansen statistic (called H1) and the estimation of the second model 
gives us another Hansen statistic (called H2). We need to use the same set of 
exogenous instruments for both estimations that is we have to assume that all the 
other orthogonality conditions hold, i.e. all the other included and excluded 
instruments remain exogenous. H1 and H2 are both distributed as a Chi-squared 
with the dof of H2 smaller than the dof of H1. The C test on GI is simply a test of H1-
H2. The test statistic H1-H2 is distributed as Chi-squared with dof equal to the 
number of regressors being tested for endogeneity (in our case 1, GDI). If it is 
endogenous, then H1-H2 will be high because H1 is high while H2 is not. In order to 
deal with the general endogeneity issue, system GMM treats the model as a system 
of equations—one for each time period—where the predetermined and endogenous 
variables in first differences are instrumented with suitable lags of their own levels 
(see Table A4, Appendix). Columns (a) and (a’) display the estimates of equation (1) 
where GDI is treated respectively as exogenous and endogenous (only with lngdp 
and pop as control variables). This allows us to calculate the statistic (H1-H2). It is 
distributed as a Chi-squared with dof=1 and it is equal to 0.03. Looking at the critical 
value of the Chi-squared distribution with 1dof, the test says that at 1 percent we do 
not reject the null: GDI is exogenous. Moreover, the coefficients of GDI, HI and 
GDI*HI are significant when GDI is endogenous. 
As mentioned above, the per capita GDP is treated as endogenous and it is 
instrumented with its own lags. We treat the low and order variable as exogenous 
and endogenous; where endogenous, it is instrumented with its own lags.  
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Results 
Table 2. Estimation results. Dependent variable: Corruption Index 
 (a)  (b)  (c)  (c’)  (d) (d’)  (e) (f) (f’) (g) 
corr (-1) 1.08*** (20.8) 
1.03*** 
(16) 
1.01*** 
(14.4) 
1.08*** 
(12.5) 
1.04*** 
(15.7) 
1.04*** 
(14.6) 
0.99*** 
(12) 
1.05*** 
(15) 
1.04*** 
(15) 
0.98*** 
(8.03) 
corr (-2) 
-
0.23*** 
(-5.7) 
-
0.21*** 
(-5.3) 
-
0.21*** 
(-4) 
-
0.23*** 
(-3.3) 
-
0.21*** 
(-4.4) 
-
0.22*** 
(-5) 
-
0.21*** 
(-4.2) 
-
0.21*** 
(-4.3) 
-
0.21*** 
(-4.5) 
-0.17** 
(-2.2) 
GDI  -0.01** (-2.23) 
-0.01** 
(-2.28) 
-0.01* 
(-3) 
-0.01* 
(-1.77) 
-
0.01*** 
(-3.18) 
-
0.01*** 
(-2.7) 
-0.01** 
(-2.5) 
-
0.01*** 
(-2.88) 
-
0.01*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.01** 
(-2.1) 
HI -0.48** (-1.92) 
-0.6** 
(-2.03) 
-0.8* 
(-2.6) 
-0.36* 
(-1.72) 
-0.6** 
(-2.10) 
-0.67* 
(-1.86) 
-0.41* 
(-1.62) 
-0.54* 
(-1.8) 
-0.59** 
(-2.01) 
-0.43* 
(-1.8) 
GDI *HI 0.02*** (2.6) 
0.02** 
(2.49) 
0.03* 
(3.2) 
0.02** 
(2.23) 
0.03*** 
(2.8) 
0.03*** 
(3.02) 
0.02** 
(1.92) 
0.03** 
(2.5) 
0.03*** 
(2.63) 
0.02* 
(1.8) 
lngdp 0.02 (0.7) 
0.02 
(0.5) 
-0.05 
(-0.7) 
0.03 
(1) 
-0.09 
(-1.1) 
-0.06 
(0.9) 
-0.02 
(-0.26) 
-0.08 
(-1.09) 
-0.09 
(-1.1) 
0.03 
(0.4) 
pop 
-5.77e-
11 
(-0.5) 
-8.90e-
11 
(-0.7) 
-2.05e-
10 
(-1) 
5.63e-
11 
(0.8) 
-1.08e-
10 
(-0.7) 
-1.45e-
10 
(-0.8) 
3.30e-
11 
(0.27) 
-1.14e-
10 
(-0.7) 
-7.88e-
11 
(-0.4) 
1.84e-
11 
(0.1) 
gov_stab  0.05*** (3.1) 
0.05* 
(2.95) 
0.03** 
(1.96) 
0.03** 
(2.4) 
0.04 
(1.54) 
0.03*** 
(2.7) 
0.03** 
(2.17) 
0.03** 
(2.2) 
0.03 
(1.48) 
dem   0.05** (1.96) 
0.003 
(0.2) 
0.003 
(2.39) 
0.02 
(0.5)  
0.004 
(0.35) 
0.006 
(0.5) 
-0.01* 
(-0.7) 
press    -0.004 (-1.1)       
law_order     0.15*** (2.73) 
0.06 
(0.5) 
0.12*** 
(2.11) 
0.13*** 
(2.6) 
0.14*** 
(2.7) 
0.10 
(1.3) 
women       0.006** (2.14)    
G/GDP        0.003 (0.8)   
G/POP         0.08* (0.8)  
lnschool          0.6 (0.8) 
N. obs. 
(n. 
groups) 
1303 
(70) 
1298 
(70) 
1191 
(69) 
1151 
(70) 
1191 
(69) 
1191 
(69) 
1155 
(69) 
1182 
(69) 
1182 
(69) 
697 
(65) 
N. 
instrum. 36 37 47 41 47 48 47 48 48 49 
Chi2 (p-
value) 
Hansen 
test 
1.1 
(0.89) 
1.9 
(0.7) 
12.4 
(0.5) 
6.6 
(0.35) 
10.4 
(0.58) 
11.9 
(0.53) 
9.36 
(0.7) 
11.6 
(0.47) 
10.2 
(0.6) 
17.3 
(0.18) 
p-value 
2nd 
order 
autocor 
0.17 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.14 0.25 0.17 0.2 0.9 
Notes. All specifications contain calendar year dummies (results not reported); the time span is 1984-
2010. The dependent variable is Corr. Standardized normal z-test values are in parentheses; cluster-
robust standard errors. lngdp is endogenous everywhere and it is instrumented with its own lags; 
law_order is endogenous in (d’) and it is instrumented with its own lags. Significant coefficients are 
indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level) and *** (1% level).Two-step estimations with Windmeijer (2005) 
correction. 
Specification (a) contains only the per capita GDP (in natural log) and population; 
the specifications which follow contain all the control variables we described above. 
The signs and significance of the political indices of interest do not change in every 
specification. At the cross-country level, our findings exactly confirm those in ABC.  
The coefficient of the GDI is negative everywhere; recalling that it is a 
disproportionality index, the more the degree of proportionality of the electoral 
system, the less the level of corruption (remember also that the higher the value of 
the Corruption index, the lower the level of corruption). This result states that the 
direct effect of the proportionality of the electoral system on corruption is positive 
also at the cross-country level and contradicts the previous empirical findings of 
Persson et al. (2003). This may be due to the fact that we distinguish electoral 
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systems according to their degree of proportionality instead of dummy variables; in 
our opinion, as stated above, the measure of proportionality is the correct way to 
identify electoral rules in an empirical setting. The magnitude of β1 is 0.01 meaning 
that if the proportionality increases, for example, by 0.1, the level of corruption 
decreases by 0.001. The HI shows a negative and significant coefficient equal, on 
average, to 0.55: a decrease in this index means an increase in political competition 
which is beneficial for corruption. Finally, the novelty of the present work (as that of 
ABC) is the interpretation of the interaction term GDI*HI, capturing the indirect effect 
of the degree of proportionality of the electoral system on corruption. Looking at the 
specification (a), we can write 
       (2) 
that is, the effect of political concentration on corruption depends positively on the 
degree of disproportionality of the electoral system. In equation (2), there is a 
threshold value of the GDI (GDI=24) such that if GDI> 24, 
HI
corr
∂
∂ > 0, if GDI<24, 
HI
corr
∂
∂ < 0. (The threshold value of GDI is the value such that 
HI
corr
∂
∂  = 0 in 
equation (2). This is equal to 24.)  
Therefore, an increase in political competition may have a positive or negative impact 
on corruption depending on whether the variable GDI is above or below that 
threshold value. The threshold values slightly change according to the estimated 
coefficients of specifications in Table 2. We can now deal with the total effect of the 
degree of proportionality of the electoral system on corruption. It depends on how 
political competition reacts to changes in the degree of proportionality of the electoral 
system. Where electoral systems are characterized by high degrees of 
proportionality, an increase (decrease) in their degrees of proportionality followed by 
an increase (decrease) in political competition, is beneficial (is not beneficial) for 
corruption because the direct and the indirect effects go in the same direction. 
Otherwise, under less proportional electoral systems (GDI above 24), an increase 
(decrease) in political competition which follows an increase (decrease) in 
proportionality, leads to the direct and the indirect effects in opposite directions. In 
this situation, in order to reduce corruption, an increase in the degree of 
proportionality should be followed by a reduction in political competitiveness. 
Therefore, if the change in political competition has the same sign as the change in 
the degree of proportionality of the electoral formula, the indirect effect strengthens 
the direct effect under more proportional rules and it mitigates the direct effect on 
corruption under less proportional regimes.  
In terms of the data, only few countries in few years of elections experienced a 
degree of proportionality greater than 24. (Those countries are Albania, Bahamas, 
France, Jamaica, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Trinidad & 
Tobago and Turkey.)  
This means that, according to our estimation, the relevant case to be considered is 
HI
corr
∂
∂ < 0.  
Now look at the other variables. Past values of Corr are always highly significant and 
the long-run effect is positive, as expected. The introduction of all the control 
variables does not change the results.The lngdp and pop are never significant. The 
government stability (gov_stab) is positive and significant, as expected, almost 
everywhere with magnitude, on average, of 0.03: an increase of 0.1 in government 
stability index leads to an increase in the Corruption index (that is, a decrease in 
corruption) of 0.003. In columns (c) and (c’) we introduce demand press: they are 
GDI=
HI
corr
∗+−
∂
∂ 0.0248.0
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both variables related to the democratization of countries. [D]emis positive, as 
expected, and significant in (c); when we introduce press in (c’), dem loses 
significance and press is not significant. We drop this latter from the following 
estimations. [L]ow_order is positive everywhere and significant only where it is 
exogenous (in (d’) it is treated as endogenous): a stronger rule of law is confirmed 
to deter corrupt behaviour. A positive sign is confirmed also for the presence of 
women in the country’s parliament. As a proxy for the government size, we control 
for both public consumption spending/GDP and public consumption 
spending/population. Only the second one is significant with positive sign. Finally, 
the rate of schooling seems to have no relevance in the explanation of corruption.  
Robustness analysis 
We perform a further robustness check of the analysis, concerning the dependent 
variable. We test the same model with the two other most widely used indicators of 
corruption worldwide: the Corruption Perceived Index (hereafter CPI) and the Control 
of Corruption Index (hereafter C_C). The CPI measures the perceived levels of 
public sector corruption (CPI, 2012). Based on expert opinion, countries are scored 
from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean). C_C Index reflects perceptions of the extent 
to which public power is exercized for private gain capturing all the forms of 
corruption by which elites and private interests take advantage from public sector. It 
ranges from approximately -2.5 (high corruption) to 2.5 (low corruption). (See Tables 
A1 and A2 for the description and statistics of those variables.) The estimation results 
are in Table 3 where we introduce, as controls, only lngdp and pop.2 
Table 3. Estimations. Dependent variables: CPI and C_C 
 (h) Dep. Var.: CPI 
 (i) 
Dep. Var.: C_C 
CPI (-1) 0.05 (0.9)  
CPI (-2) 0.46** (2.1)  
C_C (-1)  -0.08 (0.5) 
GDI  -0.08* (-1.9) 
-0.05** 
(-2) 
HI -1.81* (-1.9) 
-1.78* 
(-1.82) 
GDI *HI 0.25** (2) 
0.11* 
(1.65) 
lngdp 0.4 (1.2) 
0.33* 
(1.66) 
pop -2.15e-10 (-0.5) 
-6.63e-10* 
(-1.21) 
N. obs. (n. groups) 734 (67) 540 (69) 
N. instrum. 39 35 
Chi2 (p-value) 
Hansen test 
21.4 
(0.2) 
25.3 
(0.2) 
p-value 2nd order 
autocorrelation 0.2 0.7 
Notes. CPI is the Corruption Perception Index; C_C is the Control of Corruption Index. All specifications 
contain calendar year dummies (results not reported); in (h) the time span is 1995-2011; in (i) the time 
span is 2002-2011. Standardized normal z-test values are in parentheses; cluster-robust standard 
errors. lngdp is endogenous everywhere. Significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% 
level) and *** (1% level).Two-step estimations with Windmeijer (2005) correction. 
As we can notice, both direct and indirect effects of the degree of proportionality of 
the electoral system on corruption remain robust to different measures of corruption. 
The number of observations drastically decreases because the time span is 1995-
2 In the estimation with C_C as dependent variable, in column (i) Table 3, we introduce only one lag of 
the dependent variable because it is enough to remove the autocorrelation of residuals. 
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2011 for the CPI and 2002-2011 for the C_C. The estimated coefficients for GDI, HI 
and the interaction GDI*HI show that the threshold values of the GDI fall into the 
allowable range: it is equal to 7.24 when the dependent variable is the CPI, and it is 
equal to 16.2 when the dependent variable is the C_C. This robustness check seems 
very important; it indicates that the threshold value of the disproportionality index is 
not easily determined. The threshold value would allow to identify the direction of the 
indirect effect of the degree of proportionality on corruption, and therefore, to deal 
with the total effect. In our estimations, it depends on the corruption index we use, 
but, probably, it may widely vary among countries depending on their specific 
characteristics.  
Concluding remarks 
This work extends the ABC paper to an international context. The very interesting 
results they found, within the Italian scenario, on the role played by political 
competition in the link between the electoral system and corruption required further 
investigations in order to be generalized. Therefore, we test the same hypothesis as 
in ABC on a cross-country panel data, from 1984 to 2010. Our findings, firstly, 
contradicts previous empirical literature on cross-country data that makes plurality 
systems those most virtuous in terms of corruption. The interpretation of this 
reversed result can be due to the use of a more suitable measure of electoral rules, 
as a degree of proportionality index, instead of a dummy variable, that allowed us to 
properly consider all electoral systems in an empirical setting. Secondly, they confirm 
that one cannot draw conclusions about the way the electoral system could be 
designed as a tool in fighting corruption without considering political competition. 
Again we stress the fact that how political competition reacts to changes in the 
degree of proportionality of the electoral system, both theoretically and empirically, 
remains, until now, still unexplored.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Variables description 
Corr 
Corruption Index. It summarizes the valuation of corruption within the political system; in particular, the presence of 
corruption is a threat to foreign investment because it ‘distorts the economic and financial environment; reduces the 
efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than 
ability, and introduces an inherent instability into the political process’ 
(http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_methodology.aspx). The result is that corruption makes it difficult to conduct business 
and, in some cases, it may force the withdrawal of investments. Source: ICRG, 1984-2010.  
CPI 
Corruption Perceptions Index. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks countries and territories based on how 
corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index – a combination of polls – drawing on corruption-
related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions. The CPI reflects the views of observers from around the 
world, including experts living and working in the countries and territories evaluated - See more at: 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/in_detail/#sthash.BQB3zGZV.dpuf 
Source: Transparency International, 1995 – 2012. 
C_C 
Control of Corruption Index. It reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercized for private gain 
capturing all the forms of corruption by which elites and private interests take advantage from public sector. It is based 
on  30 underlying data sources reporting the perceptions of governance of a large number of survey  respondents and 
expert assessments worldwide. The used data are selected from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research 
dataset which estimate the quality of governance. The estimated data of governance ranges from approximately -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators by World Bank, 1996 -2011 
(with missing in 1997, 1999, 2001). 
GDI Gallagher Disproportionality index. Source: Gallagher Electoral Disproportionality Data,1945-2011 http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf. 
HI Herfindahl index. Source: Gallagher Electoral Disproportionality Data,1945-2011 http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf. 
lngdp Natural logarithm of gross domestic product at constant price 2000 US. Source: World Bank, 1980-2011. 
pop Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. Source: World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects, 1980-2011. 
gov_stab 
Government stability. It is an assessment both of the government’s ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its 
ability to stay in office. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents (Government Unity, Legislative 
Strength, Popular Support), each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum score of 0 points. A score of 4 
points equates to Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to Very High Risk. This index ranges into the interval (0, 12). 
Source: ICRG, 1984-2010. 
dem 
Democratic accountability. Measure of how responsive government is to its people, on the basis that the less responsive 
it is, the more likely it is that the government will fall, peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly violently in a non-
democratic one.  
The points in this component are awarded on the basis of the type of governance enjoyed by the country in question. 
This index ranges into the interval (0, 6). Source: ICRG, 1984-2010. 
press 
Freedom of press. Freedom House has been at the forefront in monitoring threats to media independence which  plays 
a key role in sustaining and monitoring a healthy democracy, as well as in contributing to greater accountability, good 
government, and economic development. The annual index contains the most comprehensive data set available on 
global media freedom; it  provides numerical rankings and rates each country's media as "Free," "Partly Free," or "Not 
Free". Index Score ranges from 0 to 100 cover the period 1993-2011; 0 states that press freedom is maximum and 100 
means press is absolutely not free.  During the period 1980-1992 the statistics published by Freedom House are 
expressed using the status Free, Partly Free, Not Free. The Freedom House specifies that these status could be scored 
in different intervals, in particular the status free press range in the interval [0-30]; the status partly free press range in 
the interval [31-60] and the status not free press range in the interval [61-100]. Taking these instructions, we assign the 
mean score of each interval of status only in the case the mean value of interval was very close to index score. Source: 
Freedom House’s annual Press Freedom, 1980-2014. 
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press#.VK_REU0U_IU 
law_order 
Law and Order is composed by sub-component comprising zero to three points. The Law sub-component is an 
assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of 
popular observance of the law. Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating – 3 – in terms of its judicial system, but a low 
rating – 1 – if it suffers from a very high crime rate of if the law is routinely ignored without effective sanction (for 
example, widespread illegal strikes). This index ranges into the interval (0, 6). Source: ICRG, 1984-2010. 
wom 
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%). The data referred to Unicameral assembly or lower 
chamber of bicameral assembly. These data are comparable with United Nations Women's Indicators and Statistics 
Database – Wistat published by World Bank. Source: PARLIA database, 1980-2011.  
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif-arc.htm,  
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx 
G 
General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP). It includes all government current expenditures for 
purchases of goods and services, most expenditures on national defense and security, but excludes government military 
expenditures that are part of government capital formation. Source: World Development Indicators, 1980- 2011  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.GOVT.ZS. 
lnschool 
Natural log of the net enrolment primary rate. It is the ratio between who are enrolled in primary school and the total 
population of the official primary school age. Source: World Development Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.NENR, 1980-2011. 
Polity IV 
The Polity IV index is a combined polity score ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic), 
reached by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score. The democracy and autocracy indices were 
originally constructed additively based on the following indicators: competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of 
executive recruitment, constraints on chief executive, regulation of participation, and competitiveness of participation. 
Scholars have reduced the index to a dichotomous measure of democracy and autocracy. A perfect +10 democracy, like 
Australia, Greece, and Sweden, has institutionalized procedures for open and competitive political participation; chooses 
and replaces chief executives in open, competitive elections; and imposes substantial checks and balances on the 
powers of the chief executive. In a perfect -10 autocracy, by contrast, citizens’ participation is sharply restricted or 
suppressed; chief executives are selected according to clearly defined (usually hereditary) rules of succession from 
within the established political elite; and, once in office, chief executives exercise power with few or no checks from 
legislative, judicial, or civil society institutions. A polity score of -88 indicates economies in transition. Source: Polity IV 
Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-2013: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Corr 3.39 overall 1.41 0 6 N =  2160  
 
  between 1.18   n=85 
  within 0.76   T=25 
CPI 5.02 overall 2.4 0.4 10 N = 1223  
  between 2.32   n=85 
  within 0.5   T=14 
C_C 0.34 overall 1.08 -1.7 2.56 N =  1105 
  between 1.07   n=85 
  within 0.18   T=13 
GDI 7.64 overall 6.54 0.26 33.25 N =  1975  
  between 5.46   n=85 
  within 3.67   T=23 
HI 0.3 overall 0.13 0.06 0.89 N =  1772  
  between 0.12   n=79 
  within 0.06   T=22 
lngdp 8.25 overall 1.46 4.9 10.9 N =  2566  
  between 1.44   n=83 
  within 0.22   T=31 
pop 3.97e+07 overall 1.14e+08 210600 1.24e+09 N =  2688  
  between 1.13e+08   n=84 
  within 1.89e+07   T=32 
gov_stab 7.63 overall 2.01 1 11.5 N =  2153  
  between 0.88   n=85 
  within 1.82   T=25 
dem 4.92 overall 1.79 0 11.5 N =  2153  
  between 1.43   n=85 
  within 1.05   T=25 
press 33.4 overall 19.2 5 100 N =  1762 
  between 18.2   n=85 
  within 6.2   T=21 
law_order 3.93 overall 1.53 0 6 N = 2153  
  between 1.32   n=85 
  within 0.75   T=25 
wom 14.4 overall 10.1 0 47.3 N =  2347  
  between 7.5   n=84 
  within 6.8   T=28 
G/GDP 16.5 overall 5.98 2.9 43.4 N = 2526  
  between 5.16   n=83 
  within 3.04   T=30 
G/POP 0.08 overall 0.32 3.33e-06 2.99 N = 2510 
  between 0.31   n=83 
  within 0.06   T=30 
lnschool 4.48 overall 0.2 2.9 4.6 N =  1494  
  between 0.17   n=81 
  within 0.08   T=18 
Polity IV 8.4 overall 1.79 4 10 N=1995 
  between 1.73   n=79 
  within 0.73   T=25 
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Table A3. Correlations 
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Table A4: C test. Dependent variable: Corruption Index 
 (a)  (a’) 
corr (-1) 1.83*** (20.8) 
1.08*** 
(20.8) 
corr (-2) -0.23*** (-5.7) 
-0.23*** 
(-5.7) 
GDI  -0.01** (-2.23) 
-0.007 
(-0.17) 
HI -0.48** (-1.92) 
-0.42 
(-0.7) 
GDI *HI 0.02*** (2.6) 
0.13 
(0.17) 
lngdp 0.02 (0.7) 
0.02 
(0.4) 
pop -5.77e-11 (-0.5) 
-6.23e-11 
(-0.5) 
N. obs. (n. groups) 1303 (70) 1303 (70) 
N. instrum. 36 35 
Chi2Hansen test 
(dof) 
1.1 
(4) 
1.07 
(3) 
p-value 2nd order autocorrelation 0.17 0.7 
Notes. All specifications contain calendar year dummies (results not reported); the time span is 1984-
2010. The dependent variable is Corr. Standardized normal z-test values are in parentheses; cluster-
robust standard errors. lngdp is treated as endogenous everywhere. In (a) GDI is treated as exogenous 
while in (a’) it is treated as endogenous and it is instrumented with its own lags. Significant coefficients 
are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level) and *** (1% level). Two-step estimations with Windmeijer 
(2005) correction. 
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